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ABSTRACT
A modest, but growing, body of case law is developing around the (non-)treatment of pa-
tients in the minimally conscious state. We sought to explore the approaches that the
courts take to these decisions. Using the results of a qualitative analysis, we identify ﬁve
key features of the rulings to date. First, the judges appear keen to frame the cases in
such a way that these are rightly matters for judicial determination. Secondly, the judges
appraise the types and forms of expertise that enter the courtroom, seeming to prefer the
‘objective’ and ‘scientiﬁc’, and particularly the views of the doctors. Thirdly, the judges ap-
pear alert to the reasonableness of the evidence (and, indeed, the parties) and will look
favourably on parties who are willing to co-operate. But the judges will not simply en-
dorse any consensus reached by the parties; rather, the judges will reach their own deci-
sions. Those decisions must be taken in the best interests of the patient. Fourthly, the
judges approach this assessment in different ways. A balancing exercise is not consistently
undertaken and, even in those cases in which it is, the weight accorded to particular fac-
tors varies. As we discuss, the consistency and predictability of the law in this area is open
to question. Finally, however, we cautiously suggest that some consistent messages do
begin to emerge: the courts’ apparent preference for certainty in diagnosis and prognosis
provide pointers for how cases might be decided.
KEYWORDS: Minimally conscious state, Best interests, Balancing exercise
I . INTRODUCTION
The courts are much inclined to speak of the welfare principle as an absolute
standard and an unproblematic concept which can act as a panacea for all ills
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affecting children. This is not altogether surprising since it is they who get to de-
ﬁne its content in any given situation . . . [I]t becomes apparent that the process
fails to establish coherent and consistent principles to govern matters which . . .
are important issues of public policy.1
Bainham’s remarks were made in 1987 and were directed speciﬁcally towards the
judges’ approaches to determining the welfare or ‘best interests’ of children. Despite
three decades of judicial and legislative developments, his comment appears no less
pertinent today, and not only to judges’ decisions about minors.2 In this article, we ex-
plore judicial decisions about the best interests of incapacitated adults, speciﬁcally
those in the minimally conscious state (MCS). Patients with this disorder of con-
sciousness have increasingly come before the courts for a decision about their treat-
ment and, in particular, non-treatment. We explored all of the rulings up to July 2016
we could ﬁnd in English law involving these patients, with a view to identifying the
courts’ approaches to these cases. This is not an arid critical exercise. There are esti-
mated to be 12,000–48,000 patients in the MCS in the UK;3 treatment might well
continue for many of these patients but there will be some for whom non-treatment is
being contemplated, so the messages emanating from the English courts might have
import for a great many patients, as well as their loved ones, healthcare professionals
and others who are providing them with care and treatment.4
Our focus is on describing and illustrating the themes we detected in seventeen of
the MCS (and, as will be explained, related) rulings; ﬁrst, however, we outline the na-
ture of the MCS and the legal framework that governs the (non-)treatment of such
patients, before detailing the methods by which we have found these themes.
I I . DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE COURTS
Our current understanding of disorders of consciousness can be traced back to the in-
tensive efforts of medical scientists in the 1950s.5 Various types of disorder are nowa-
days recognised, of which three need explanation here. In coma, the patient is
unresponsive, his or her eyes are closed and movement is limited to reﬂexive re-
sponses.6 Having been recognised by the Ancient Greeks, systematic diagnosis of
coma developed from the mid-19th century.7 The vegetative state (VS) was ﬁrst rec-
ognised in 1940,8 with the term ‘persistent vegetative state’ (PVS) following in 1972,
1 A Bainham, ‘Handicapped Girls and Judicial Parents’ (1987) 103L Quart Rev 334, 339.
2 Eg R Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or Not to Treat? (Routledge
2012).
3 S Bunn and Z Fritz, Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States (POST Note 489, Parliamentary Ofﬁce of
Science and Technology March 2015), 1.
4 Including the public bodies that fund treatment, which may, on a crude cost basis, be unwilling to initiate le-
gal proceedings, if they feel the outcome of proceedings is uncertain.
5 PJ Koehler and EF Wijdicks, ‘Historical Study of Coma: Looking Back through Medical and Neurological
Texts’ (2008) 131 Brain 877–89.
6 Royal College of Physicians (2013) Prolonged disorders of consciousness: National clinical guidelines, London:
RCP.
7 Koehler and Wijdicks (n 5).
8 As ‘Apallic Syndrome’. See: E Kretschmer, ‘Das Apallische Syndrome’ (1940) 169 Gesamte Neurol
Psychiatr 576.
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to refer to those who remained in this state for long periods.9 In PVS, patients sponta-
neously open their eyes in the course of normal sleep and waking cycles, but show no
signs of awareness. They show signs of arousal, which may manifest in laughing, cry-
ing or violent movement (for example), but this is not in response to external stimuli,
so is not consistently reproducible. Nowadays, guidance from the Royal College of
Physicians stipulates that VS is to be described as ‘continuing’ (rather than ‘persis-
tent’) if it lasts more than 4 weeks, and ‘permanent’ if it lasts more than 6 months fol-
lowing head injury or 12 months when arising from another cause.10
By the 1990s, queries about the prognostic value of a PVS diagnosis and gathering
evidence of awareness in some patients diagnosed with PVS was prompting disquiet
amongst some of those working in neurological rehabilitation.11 The ‘minimally con-
scious state’ (MCS) emerged as the deﬁnitive term to describe some of these patients
in a 2002 diagnostic guideline.12 Patients in MCS show limited, but consistent and re-
producible, signs of awareness. These signs may include visually tracking objects, bod-
ily movements, vocalisations and speech, and diagnosis is generally made using the
Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique (SMART) and the
Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM) tools.
Given their limited consciousness and awareness, patients in the VS or MCS
require support from professional, as well as unpaid or familial, carers. As they are un-
able safely to eat or drink by conventional means, patients will be reliant on clinically-
assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) ie some form of tube feeding. Feeding
tubes will sometimes become displaced or need to be replaced, necessitating decisions
about whether or not re-insertion should occur. And sometimes those close to the pa-
tient will seek to have tube-feeding withdrawn.
The law obviously has a stake in such life-or-death decisions. Indeed, medical law
has a longstanding interest in disorders of consciousness and the dilemmas associated
with treating patients with such disorders. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in
Quinlan in 1976, which concerned the (non-)treatment of a patient in the PVS, is ar-
guably one of the key starting points in the development of this distinct ﬁeld of law.13
In the past two decades, decisions like these have increasingly come before the
English courts, with numerous high-proﬁle rulings addressing the treatment that such
patients should (not) receive.
9 B Jennett and F Plum, ‘Persistent Vegetative State after Brain Damage. A Syndrome in Search of a Name’
(1972) 1(7753) Lancet 734.
10 Royal College of Physicians (n 6).
11 JT Giacino and others, ‘Monitoring Rate of Recovery to Predict Outcome in Minimally Responsive
Patients’ (1991) 72(11) Arch Phys Med Rehabil 897; DD Tresch and others, ‘Clinical Characteristics of
Patients in the Persistent Vegetative State’ (1991) 151(5) Arch Intern Med 930; NL Childs, WN Mercer
and HW Childs, ‘Accuracy of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State’ (1993) 43(8) Neurology 1465; K
Andrews and others, ‘Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in a Rehabilitation Unit’
(1996) 313(7048) BMJ 13.
12 JT Giacino, and others, ‘The Minimally Conscious State: Deﬁnition and Diagnostic Criteria’ (2002) 58(3)
Neurology 349.
13 In re Quinlan (1976) NJ 355 A 2d 647. See eg PDG Skegg, ‘The Termination of Life-Support Measures and
the Law of Murder’ (1978) 41 Modern Law Review 423.
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English law ﬁrst took a position on the withdrawal or withholding of life-support
from patients in the PVS in the Bland ruling in 1993.14 Breaking legal ground in this
jurisdiction, the Lords decided that the withdrawal of CANH was permissible in the
‘best interests’ of Anthony Bland. The Lords signalled that future such cases would re-
quire judicial determination, a requirement that remains in place,15 despite the misgiv-
ings of some commentators.16 Indeed, Bland remains the leading ruling in this area,
notwithstanding the changes effected by the Mental Capacity Act 2005,17 which came
into force in 2007. Of course, Bland concerned a patient in the (P)VS. MCS was ﬁrst
mentioned in court in 2002, in A v H,18 in which a neurologist posited a diagnosis of
MCS in a PVS patient, due to the presence of features incompatible with the diagnos-
tic guidelines for PVS. A declaration approving the removal of CANH was neverthe-
less issued. This is not the only case to have come before the courts in which some of
the criteria for diagnosing PVS have not been met, but the diagnosis was nevertheless
accepted, and treatment withdrawn.19 However, MCS has since been confronted
squarely,20 and further cases can be anticipated because, since 2007, the withdrawal of
CANH from these patients must also be decided in court.21
The courts’ decisions in this area are nowadays governed by the Mental Capacity
Act 2005. According to this Act, incapacity involves the inability to make or communi-
cate a particular decision due to ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning
of, the mind or brain’.22 Capacity is to be presumed,23 but this may be found lacking
where the individual is unable ‘(a) to understand the information relevant to the deci-
sion, (b) to retain that information, (c) to use or weigh that information as part of the
process of making the decision, or (d) to communicate his decision’.24 A patient who
lacks capacity can seek to determine (or at least inﬂuence) his or her future treatment
by making an advance decision to refuse treatment or by conferring a lasting power of
attorney.25 Recipients of the latter are, however, required to make their decisions in
the patient’s best interests—and this is the standard that generally governs if the pa-
tient has not conferred such a power or issued an advance decision. The Mental
Capacity Act sets out a checklist of factors to consider when determining the best in-
terests of incapacitated adults, which requires reference to ‘the person’s past and
14 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
15 Department for Constitutional Affairs, The Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice (The Stationery
Ofﬁce, London, 2007), [6.18], [8.18]; Court of Protection Rules, Practice Direction 9E.
16 Eg S Halliday, A Formby and R Cookson, ‘An Assessment of the Court’s Role in the Withdrawal of
Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration from Patients in the Permanent Vegetative State’ (2015) 23(4)
Med L Rev 556; C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Court Applications for Withdrawal of Artiﬁcial Nutrition and
Hydration from Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State: Family Experiences’ (2016) 42(1) J Med Ethics
11.
17 W v M and S and A NHS Primary Care Trust [2011] EWHC 2443, per Baker J at [85].
18 NHS Trust A v H [2002] 1 FCR 713.
19 The cases we know of are: Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994] 2 All ER 403; Re D [1997] 38 BMLR
1; Re H (adult: medical treatment) [1998] 3 FCR 174.
20 W v M (n 17).
21 Court of Protection Rules, Practice Direction 9E, [5].
22 s 2(1).
23 s 1(2).
24 s 3(1).
25 ss 24–26, 9–14, respectively.
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present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made
by him when he had capacity)’, ‘the beliefs and values that would be likely to inﬂuence
his decision if he had capacity’, and ‘the other factors that he would be likely to con-
sider if he were able to do so’.26
We sought to explore how the courts approach such best interests decisions, specif-
ically when dealing with MCS patients. Before outlining the themes we detected, we
will ﬁrst explain the methods by which we located the relevant rulings and undertook
our analysis thereof.
I I I . EXPLORING THE JUDGMENTS: METHODS
This article forms part of a larger project, which seeks to explore the way(s) in which
‘best interests’ manifest, coincide and diverge in medical law and bioethics.27 The
project focuses on ‘best interests’ in the courtroom and, in particular, in judges’ rul-
ings. Legal judgments capture the judge’s summary of the case and decision thereon.
As such, they are written by the judge for the consumption of the affected parties, as
well as interested observers and the wider public. Of course, these are not verbatim
transcripts of the entire court proceedings. While such a transcript contains all of the
evidence, including witness testimony and cross-examination, a judgment is necessar-
ily more selective: the judge decides which evidence to include, which precedents to
draw on, and which areas of the narrative to emphasise. Fuller transcripts can be ob-
tained at a cost, but judgments tend to be publically available and are an appropriate
focal point, as these express and interpret the law.
Our aim was to focus on a discrete cluster of judgments, as this was practicable
and would enable us to develop and test methods of research that occupy the interface
of law, bioethics, and qualitative research. Reasoning that the methods involved in
ethico-legal analysis are sometimes opaque, we sought systematic methods that would
add transparency and reproducibility to our analysis.28 We chose as our cluster of rul-
ings those determining the treatment or non-treatment of people in MCS, including
those patients for whom this was a possible diagnosis. In the rulings we identiﬁed, the
withdrawal or withholding of life-supporting treatment was in issue, and in particular
CANH.29
We chose to focus on MCS cases because the rulings are topical, appear relatively
novel, and were few enough in number to allow thorough analysis within the time
available. In order to obtain the rulings, Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases were
searched in December 2015 (and again in July 2016) using the keywords ‘minimally
conscious state’, ‘vegetative state’, ‘treatment withdrawal’, and ‘artiﬁcial nutrition’.30 At
the same time(s), the Medical Law Review online database was searched for relevant
related literature, and the resultant list augmented by existing literature reviews
26 s 4(6).
27 ‘Best Interests in Medical Ethics and Law (BABEL)’, initially funded by a Wellcome Trust Seed award
(110076/Z/15/Z).
28 Such transparency is increasingly called for by funders anxious to understand how research is conducted.
29 Provision of CANH is at issue in 12 of the 17 judgments examined.
30 No date limits were imposed. Cases were included if they concerned decision(s) about (non-)treatment in
the best interests of a person who was, or possibly was, in a MCS.
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conducted for the authors’ prior research in this area. Snowball searches captured ad-
ditional rulings that were cited in the references or commentaries.
In total, 17 rulings were found, including seven in which MCS was either queried
or a diagnostic possibility on the facts of the case (Table 1).31 The judgments were
imported into NVivo 10, a software package that aids the analysis of textual sources.
Thematic analysis was used, a method commonly deployed for the analysis of social
science data in order to discover ideas and concepts that occur across a set of sour-
ces.32 While typically associated with qualitative analysis of empirical data (from, for
example, interviews or focus groups), this sort of method has been used to analyse
documentary sources, for example in the context of qualitative meta-analysis,33 as well
as, pertinently, analyses of Hansard, media reports and Supreme Court rulings.34 To
ﬁnd themes, we adapted the method set out by Braun and Clarke:35 The judgments
were closely read and ‘codes’ relating to frequently occurring words, phrases, and
topics devised inductively and applied line-by-line. The themes reported here were
discovered by comparing and aggregating these codes with other codes containing
similar concepts, a process that was repeated iteratively until broad themes were de-
veloped that could be traced back to the original text. Broad descriptions of themes
were written, with direct quotations selected to illustrate each theme,36 and the entire
judgments were then re-read to ensure the themes were faithful to the original con-
text. Analysis was primarily undertaken by the second author; however, to ensure con-
sistent coding, four of the judgments were coded in parallel by both authors, and
consensus reached about the applicability of particular codes. Themes were regularly
discussed as the analysis developed.
Two notes on the nature of our work are warranted. First, the analysis here is qual-
itative, as opposed to quantitative. We have nevertheless provided some quantitative
information, such as the number of times a code was identiﬁed and the number of rul-
ings in which this occurred. Such an approach should add transparency (thereby
hopefully making a modest contribution to doctrinal scholarship). However, the
quantitative information should be treated cautiously. Coded passages may vary in
length and coding may be revisited as themes emerge. Ultimately, the focus should be
on the themes, rather than the codes. Secondly, qualitative data are produced using a
naturalistic, rather than positivistic, paradigm. In other words, rather than collecting
objectively reproducible statistical information, qualitative work collects the subjective
31 As we were ﬁnalising the manuscript, an eighteenth case was being decided: Briggs v Briggs [2016] EWCOP
53. In a ground-breaking development, permission was granted for live tweeting of the proceedings by
@KitzingerCelia, @JennyKitzinger and@cdocuk using #COPBriggs.
32 V Braun and V Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qual Res Psychol 77.
33 J Thomas and A Harden, ‘Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic
Reviews’ (2008) 8 BMCMed Res Methodol 45.
34 Eg SJ Ellis and C Kitzinger, ‘Denying Equality: An Analysis of Arguments against Lowering the Age of
Consent for Sex between Men’ (2002) 12(3) J Comm & Applied Social Psychol 167. cf RJ Cahill-
O’Callaghan, ‘Reframing the Judicial Diversity Debate: Personal Values and Tacit Diversity’ (2015) 35(1)
LS 1 (note that Cahill-O’Callaghan used a deductive process, in which a set of codes were imposed on the
data, which differs from the inductive process of coding and theme formation which we undertook).
35 Above (n 32).
36 Ellis and Kitzinger (n 34).
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impressions of the researcher(s) about the meaning, inference and tone of the content
under examination. Sampling strategy is also important, as samples are usually purpo-
sively selected for relevance and not representative of a wider whole, so not typically
generalizable. Our rulings are but a sample of those determining the best interests of
incapacitated patients, but we notably sought to capture the entire published popula-
tion of cases that speciﬁcally concerned those in the MCS. Inevitably there will be
(perhaps many) unreported cases. As such, it is an interesting question whether our
ﬁndings might be generalizable, even if only to future cases of this speciﬁc sort.
Drawing on our ﬁndings, we later comment on the predictability of future rulings,
which suggest some efforts at generalisation. We leave it to the reader to judge
whether this is a defensible strategy.
Two of the emergent themes (‘Facts, Evidence and Experts’ and ‘Judicial
Approaches and Processes’), which were based on aggregating 21 codes, are reported
TABLE 1. Cases germane to Minimally Conscious State
Ruling Court Diagnosis Order sought Outcome
Frenchay v S [1994] 2 All ER 403 CA Possible MCS Withhold CANH Granted
Re D [1997] 38 BMLR 1 Fam Possible MCS Withdraw CANH Granted
Re H [1998] 3 FCR 174 Fam Possible MCS Withhold CANH Granted
NHS Trust A v H [2002]
1 FCR 713
Fam Possible MCS Withhold CANH Granted
W v KH [2004] EWCA 1324 CA Possible MCS Continue CANH Granted
W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 COP MCS Withdraw CANH Rejected
Re JD [2012] EWHC 4420 Fam Queried MCS Withdraw CANH Granted
NHS Trust v L [2013]
EWHC 4313
Fam MCS Withhold CPR Granted
Aintree v James [2013] UKSC 67 SC MCS Withhold LST Granted
NHS v VT [2014] COPLR 44 COP MCS Withhold CPR Granted
Shefﬁeld v TH [2014] EWCOP 4 COP MCS Continue LST Deferred
County Durham v PP [2014]
EWCOP 9
COP MCS Withdraw CANH Granted
Lincolnshire v N [2014]
EWCOP 16
COP MCS Withhold CANH Granted
Gloucestershire v AB [2014]
EWCOP 49
COP Queried MCS Withdraw CANH Granted
St George’s v P [2015]
EWCOP 42
COP MCS Withhold LST Rejected
M v N [2015] EWCOP 76 COP MCS Withdraw CANH Granted
Re S [2016] EWCOP 32 COP Queried MCS Withdraw CANH Granted
Key: CANH¼Clinically-assisted Nutrition and Hydration; CA¼Court of Appeal;
COP¼Court of Protection; CPR¼Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation; Fam¼ Family Court;
LST¼ Life Sustaining Treatment; MCS¼Minimally Conscious State; SC¼ Supreme Court
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here (Table 2).37 Our question in this article is: what approaches do the courts take
to these cases? The answers arising from our themes have been organised into the fol-
lowing ﬁve sections: a decision for a court; heeding the experts; rewarding consensus;
striking a balance; and seeking certainty.
IV. A DECISION FOR A COURT
The ﬁrst notable approach taken by the courts in MCS cases involves the judges fram-
ing the cases before them in such a way that a judicial decision is required. There are
ﬁve features of these rulings that create this framing.
First, the judges often refer to the tragic nature of the case—‘This is another of the
very sad cases of a patient who has suffered very serious brain damage’38—and will ex-
press their sympathy for the family.39 Tragic cases, we might presume, are likely to be
difﬁcult cases. Of course, not every difﬁcult case involving the care of an incapacitated
patient will reach a court; however, the recurrence of these remarks begins to convey
the sense that the judges feel there is a role for them to play here.
That sense is strengthened by those cases in which, secondly, the judges highlight
any disputes arising in the case, such as disagreements between the clinicians and the
family. Conﬂicts are, of course, routinely the court’s business, and some level of dis-
pute might be expected given the adversarial nature of law. The judges will neverthe-
less occasionally censure overly adversarial parties. For example, Cobb J appears
critical of the patient’s son-in-law in PP, who ‘devoted signiﬁcant time and energy into
collating evidence for a potential civil action, which I cannot but observe has detracted
a little from the key issues engaged in these proceedings’.40 Clinicians have also been
criticised for impeding the settlement of a dispute, by failing to give ground to a family
that has ‘politely and cogently articulated’ its opposition.41 By conveying the existence
and persistence of such disputes, the courts appear to reinforce their standing as the
appropriate forum in which to resolve these cases.
This standing can be further reinforced in, thirdly, the detailed chronology that is
provided by the judge, which traces the course of the patient’s condition, the investi-
gations undertaken, visits by expert witnesses, and the like. In H, the relevant interval
was 8 years and everyone—professionals, family members, and judge—agreed that
withdrawal of treatment was appropriate.42 Here, the history of the patient, dates of
examinations and relevant reports are conveyed in just six paragraphs.43 Contrast this
with W v M: the relevant interval was also 8 years but here opinions about withdrawal
were split, and twenty-one paragraphs are devoted to the clinical narrative.44 The
length of these accounts seems indicative of the difﬁculty involved in the case: the
37 The remaining codes and themes, many of which relate to ethical values in the judgments, will be addressed
in a separate article.
38 Eg Re H (n 19), per Sir Stephen Brown P at 175.
39 Eg An NHS Trust v L [2013] EWHC 4313, per Moylan J at [102].
40 County Durham & Darlington NHS Foundation v PP, H, D and S [2014] EWCOP 9, per Cobb J at [8].
41 St George’s v P [2015] EWCOP 42, per Newton J at [7].
42 A v H (n 18).
43 ibid.
44 W v M (n 17).
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longer the account, the greater the apparent unease of the protagonists, and arguably
the greater the need for judicial appraisal.
Fourthly, the urgency of the decision will also be highlighted where appropriate.
On occasion, the judges are critical of the time that has been taken to bring a case to
court, if this means that the patient’s ‘rights are compromised in consequence of
avoidable delay’.45 Where a case is deemed urgent, then this may incline the courts to
expedite matters. Frenchay is particularly notable in this regard: the parties were in the
early stages of seeking withdrawal of CANH, but the dislodgement of the patient’s
feeding tube created a sense of urgency; the court authorised the withholding of fur-
ther feeding, despite the patient not fully meeting the VS diagnostic criteria.46 This
construction of a sense of urgency has occurred since,47 and perhaps questionably so.
The orthodox position is that withholding and withdrawing are to be treated as legally
synonymous. In cases like Frenchay, the courts appear to seize the opportunity to
withhold, rather than withdraw, as a matter of urgency. If, however, the two are synon-
ymous, then the urgency arguably disappears—the feeding tube can be reinserted and
then later withdrawn, if the court so decides.48 A sense of urgency nevertheless helps
to shore up the court’s position as the rightful decision-maker.
Finally, in four of the cases, the judges referred to the uniqueness of the case before
them.49 For example, in VT, Hayden J notes that ‘every case is different’,50 and he
cites Hedley J in Wyatt: ‘The inﬁnite variety of the human condition never ceases to
surprise and it is that fact that defeats any attempt to be more precise in a deﬁnition
of best interests’.51
Taken together, these observations seem to make the case that the withdrawal or
withholding of life-supporting treatment from patients in the MCS is properly a deci-
sion for the courts. Perhaps these framings reveal that the judges are aware of the criti-
cism, levelled particularly at CANH decisions for PVS patients,52 that judicial
oversight is required, and they are seeking to undergird their power to decide. In
short, a tragic, contested, urgent, complex, and unique case is a matter for the judges.
Of course, the mere presence of such factors in a case reveals nothing about the deci-
sion that might then by taken by the judge. We begin to get closer to this by looking
to the ways in which the courts view the different types and forms of expertise that en-
ter the courtroom in these cases.
45 Re S [2016] EWCOP 32, per Hayden J at [13].
46 Frenchay (n 19).
47 Eg United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N [2014] EWCOP 16; Re D (n 19).
48 We should note, however, that some sort of distinction might hold in some cases, in which a narrow ‘win-
dow of opportunity’ for non-treatment is perceived: see J Kitzinger and C Kitzinger, ‘The “window of op-
portunity” for Death after Severe Brain Injury: Family Experiences’ (2013) 35(7) Sociol Health and Illness
1095.
49 Besides NHS v VT and A [2014] COPLR 44, the instances are: St George’s v P (n 41), per Newton J at
[18]; Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, per Lady Hale at [36];
andW v M (n 17) at [75].
50 NHS v VT, ibid per Hayden J at [20].
51 Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247, at [23].
52 See n 16.
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V. HEEDING THE EXPERTS
Outwardly at least, the law seeks to empower the patient.53 Of course, as they lack ca-
pacity, patients in a minimally conscious state cannot presently articulate their wishes
and preferences, at least in any direct and unmediated sense. When a patient lacks ca-
pacity, an advance decision to refuse treatment offers the most direct and powerful ex-
pression of such wishes that a court might encounter; less directly, but also
importantly, the court might hear such wishes via the opinion of the donee of a lasting
power of attorney. However, neither of these legal instruments were enacted by the
patients who featured in our judgments. As such, in these cases, other people (or
types of evidence) claim to speak for or on behalf of the patient, but in all cases the
patient’s views are mediated by these ‘others’. These ‘others’ implicitly appear to claim
some sort of ‘expertise’ about or over the patient. Here, we draw out four distinct
types of expertise on which the judges tend to reﬂect when reaching a judgment. It is
apparent that the different types of expertise—and types of ‘expert’—exert varying de-
grees of inﬂuence over the ﬁnal decision that is reached.
Family expertise featured in fourteen of the seventeen rulings, with the judges re-
ﬂecting on the experiences and views of the patient’s family, as a step towards reaching
their decisions. Of course, under both the Mental Capacity Act and the preceding law,
the court’s concern must be with the best interests of the patient, arguably irrespective
of the family’s views per se. Certainly, such views should nowadays be sought as a
means of ﬁnding the patient’s best interests—and they must be sought and heeded if
the family member in question has a lasting power of attorney (which, as noted, was
not the situation in any of the cases here). However, these views do not have free-
standing weight: relatives can indicate what they think the patient would say if he or
she could be consulted,54 or otherwise indicate the values of the patient,55 but the key
consideration is indeed the best interests of the patient, not the views and values of
the family.
This is borne out in the present cases, since a family’s views appear at most to lend
supplemental weight to a decision being taken in a particular direction. As such, in A v
H, Butler-Sloss P states:
The family, for whom this has been over many years an extremely distressing ex-
perience, have said for a number of years that they did not wish their mother to
continue to be artiﬁcially kept alive and that they would wish this to come to an
end. Therefore the family is entirely in agreement with the application of the
hospital.56
This comment is striking, since the statement is not linked to the (past) wishes of the
patient, which is how family views would nowadays be framed. But note that the fam-
ily’s views seem only to gain weight insofar as they accord with the views of the
doctors.
53 Eg Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(6).
54 EgWHealthcare Trust v KH, H and PH [2004] EWCA 1324;W v M (n 17).
55 Eg Re D (n 19);M v N [2015] EWCOP 76.
56 A v H (n 18), per Dame Butler-Sloss P at 718.
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The (merely?) supplementary value of family views is also evident elsewhere, in
cases in which their views are attached to something other than the doctors’ views. In
P, Newton J focuses on a dispute between the family and the hospital:
In looking at those aspects and as to whether or not P would assess his life as be-
ing regarded as worthwhile I attach far more weight to the relevant expressions
of his articulate and well informed family members and friends who have direct
knowledge of P’s pre-injury knowledge, understanding and philosophy, in partic-
ular those who know about his beliefs and values.57
Here, while the family perspective is ﬁrmly favoured over that of the medical, the
statement allies the family view with that of the patient’s past values. Within these
cases then, the family view is not sufﬁciently inﬂuential on its own account.
Notwithstanding Newton J’s misgivings in P, it is overwhelmingly apparent in all
of the cases that medical expertise carries a great deal of weight with the courts. The
special qualiﬁcation and experience of the doctor is frequently given special promi-
nence, as illustrated by Frenchay:
The consultant in question, whose curriculum vitae is before us, is a consultant
of very wide and long experience in the treatment of the acutely disabled, includ-
ing the young acutely disabled. It is apparent from his curriculum vitae that he
has the most extensive and wide ranging experience in this country and abroad.
He is extremely well qualiﬁed in medical terms and he has also, perhaps rele-
vantly, engaged himself in the consideration of ethical questions.58
The latter idea that doctors might have some form of ethical expertise is occasionally
detectable in subsequent rulings, on occasion being mentioned explicitly,59 elsewhere
featuring implicitly.60 What features more regularly in the judgments is an emphasis
upon those occasions when the medical professionals are in consensus. For example,
inM v N, Hayden J notes:
There is complete agreement between the doctors that Mrs. N is suffering from
very advanced Multiple Sclerosis. Given that this is a degenerative disorder the
concept of rehabilitation has strikingly limited utility. Whilst some pragmatic ad-
justments could be made to improve the very limited quality of Mrs. N’s life,
when these were analysed properly, all agreed they could accurately be charac-
terised as palliative care.61
While consensus between doctors might appear to inﬂuence the judges, it is notable
that the degree of consensus between family members appears to attract no comment.
57 St George’s v P (n 41), per Newton J at [40].
58 Frenchay (n 19), per Sir Thomas BinghamMR at 405.
59 Eg noting that an expert witness in VT (n 49) chaired a clinical ethics committee (at [9]).
60 The judge imputes ethical sensitivity and ‘compassion’ to a medical witness in Lincolnshire (n 47), per
Paufﬂey J at [62–63].
61 M v N (n 55), per Hayden J at [33–34].
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Evidently, a different degree of weight is accorded to medical views as opposed to
family views. Indeed, sometimes the family view may be in need of correction by the
clinicians. For example, in a speech about the relative weight of expertise in M v N,
Hayden J warns:
family members may sometimes interpret simple reﬂexive movements as more
positive interactions. They need information and support from clinicians who
can explain what behaviours to look for.62
Doctors may correct families, but the judges seem less inclined to suggest that families
might correct doctors.63 It is certainly made apparent in some cases,64 following previ-
ous case law,65 that a doctor cannot be compelled to give treatment against his or her
clinical judgment:
That, in my judgment, is not only medically contrary to his best interest, it is dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile with the underlying theological premise that the family ad-
vances. It can hardly be right to expect doctors to cause pain for no justiﬁable
medical reason other than to accommodate the religious or other beliefs of a
patient.66
Such a principle suggests not only that doctors have an epistemically favoured posi-
tion, but also that their professional status grants them particular privileges as well.
Non-medical expertise—such as is offered by nurses, allied health professionals like
physiotherapists and occupational therapists, or full-time care assistants—receives a
rather more mixed treatment. The most favourable account of such evidence was pro-
vided by Baker J in W v M. Here, the testimony of the patient’s professional carers
was ultimately favoured over that of the patient’s family:
Like Professor Turner-Stokes, I wondered when I ﬁrst read the papers whether
the carers were over-interpreting M’s behaviour, seeing what they wanted to see.
Professor Turner-Stokes has come to accept that the carers’ accounts are
broadly accurate. Unlike Professor Turner-Stokes, I have also the beneﬁt, not
only of reading the carers’ statements, but also listening to them give oral evi-
dence over a number of days. I have been impressed, indeed moved, by their
professionalism and dedication to their demanding job. Although most of them
hold a clear view that ANH should not be withdrawn in this case, I ﬁnd that
62 ibid at [22].
63 In our series, this happens once: St George’s v P (n 41).
64 Three cases afﬁrm this principle: Frenchay (n 19); L (n 39), at [116]; VT (n 49) at [27], with a fourth case,
St George’s v P (n 41) seeming to contradict this principle: ‘There is almost nothing to rebut the very strong
presumption that it is in P’s best interests to stay alive. I order and direct that the renal replacement therapy
should continue’ (per Newton J at [45]). For further discussion of the implications of this judgment see: JC
Youngs, ‘Can the Courts Force the Doctor’s Hand? St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P [2015] EWCOP
42’ (2016) 24 Med L Review 99.
65 Re J (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 753, per Lord Donaldson MR at 762.
66 VT (n 49), per Hayden J at [27].
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they have remained objective in the evidence they have given and that their ac-
counts are reliable and accurate.67
Along with nursing staff, carers like these are likely to have the most contact with the
patient. However, the judges rarely afford the evidence of allied health professionals
such prominence or assign it such positive value as it was granted in W v M. More of-
ten, allied health professional testimony is conﬁned to brief acknowledgements that
these witnesses are in agreement with the doctor or, more rarely, have expressed
dissent:
she may gain pleasure from things which one of her care home carers (albeit
that her close family members believe differently) consider she has derived plea-
sure - company, some television programmes, some physical touch.68
Such expressions of dissent are often considered in a cursory manner:
The entries in certain of the nursing records to which I have been referred have
not in fact been substantiated in any meaningful way by the repeated examina-
tions of the numerous medical experts.69
When, in the rare case, allied health professional testimony does acquire prominence,
it is usually because this needs to be corrected. In Re JD, for example, the physiother-
apy team that challenged a VS diagnosis was judged to have ‘innocently misinter-
preted’ the patient’s vocalisations.70
The ﬁnal source of expertise to which the judges frequently refer is what we term
‘objective’ expertise. Here, we refer to the evidence provided by empirical assessment
‘tools’, such as SMART and WHIM, which systematically measure the responsiveness
of the patient. The courts have endorsed the use of such tools since the decision in W
v M, where Baker J suggested that the outcome in that case, that treatment continue,
demonstrated the crucial role played by the formal assessment tools, the
SMART and the WHIM. The history of this case shows how cases may be mis-
diagnosed if these tools are not used.71
While the use of such tools may be ‘crucial’, the judges have nevertheless resisted the
idea that the tests’ ﬁndings will be determinative. Even the very use of these tools
must be balanced against other factors, in view of the delays their use might entail:
This is not to say that assessments ought to be rushed or that delays may not
sometimes be clinically purposive, but respect for a patient’s autonomy, dignity
67 W v M (n 17), per Baker J at [251].
68 Lincolnshire (n 47), per Paufﬂey J at [58].
69 Re H (n 19), per Sir Stephen Brown P at 177.
70 Re JD [2012] EWHC 4420, per Roderic Wood J at [22].
71 W v M (n 17), at [258].
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and integrity requires all involved in these difﬁcult cases to keep in focus that
these important rights are compromised in consequence of avoidable delay.72
Moreover, as Hayden J points out in M v N, the ﬁndings should not be treated as de-
terminative because the tools are not entirely ‘objective’. He compares the veracity of
the tool’s ﬁndings to the reports of family members, noting that the assessments are
susceptible to inbuilt professional bias. Professional enthusiasm and determina-
tion are admirable qualities and are to be nurtured, but it is important to guard
against overly optimistic assessment driven by a vocational desire to try to make
a difference. These assessments tools have an inevitably subjective complexion
to them.73
Assessment tools may be a ‘crucial’ aid, but it appears that that is all they are – an aid
to assessment and, by extension, an aid to judgment as to what should or should not
happen in terms of the patient’s care.
In sum, the judges will appraise the different types and forms of expertise that enter
the courtroom and, in doing so, they display a clear preference for (seemingly) ‘objec-
tive’ tests and, in particular, the views of the doctors. However, this is not a consistent
ﬁnding—sometimes other evidence, arising from other forms of expertise, appears to
assume prominence. The message appears to be that judgment is a matter for the
court. That, of course, is implicit in the very nature of judging, so may be unsurprising.
But it does not yet tell us enough about the approaches the judges will take or the de-
cision that might ultimately be made. To get closer to these, we must move to our
next section, which discusses the judges’ indications about the approaches on which
they look favourably and unfavourably.
VI . REWARDING CONSENSUS
The judges’ approaches to these cases is further revealed in the comments that they
make about the approaches that are taken by others, speciﬁcally the relevant protago-
nists involved, or with an interest, in the patient’s care. These comments emphasise
co-operation, consensus, compromise, and the reasonableness of the parties.
Starting with co-operation, the judges are occasionally inclined to urge the parties to
work together:
So far as the future is concerned, there must be a radical review of M’s care plan.
I ﬁrmly believe that this is a process that should, if possible, be carried out by
family members and professionals working together. The Court of Protection is
here to help with those endeavours if necessary, but in the ﬁrst instance, I urge
all parties to try to agree a plan for M’s future care.74
72 Re S (n 45), per Hayden J at [13].
73 M v N (n 55), per Hayden J at [22].
74 W v M (n 17), per Baker J at [254].
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The judges have praised a co-operative approach, in which (for example) the doctors
communicate openly with family members and adjust their plans in light of family in-
put.75 This apparent preference for collaboration reﬂects wider ethico-legal support
for ‘shared decision-making’.76
Implicit in this apparent preference is the idea that co-operation is a reasonable
way to proceed. Sometimes the judges will explicitly remark on the reasonableness of
the parties or the evidence. Reference was made to the reasonableness of the patient’s
chances of survival in L.77 The latter sort of reﬂection is invited by the Mental
Capacity Act, as the Code states that ‘All reasonable steps which are in the person’s
best interests should be taken to prolong their life’.78 The Act itself requires the as-
sessment of the patient’s best interests to involve, ‘so far as is reasonably ascertain-
able’, reference to the patient’s views and values.79 However, in Aintree, the Supreme
Court, disagreeing with the Court of Appeal, emphasised that it is the patient’s views
and values that should be considered, not the views and values of the reasonable pa-
tient.80 Presumably, the patient’s views and values can be reasonable or unreasonable,
but, in their dealings with other protagonists and evidence, the courts otherwise ap-
pear to favour reasonableness. We have already seen some of the judges’ aversion to
adversarial parties. Elsewhere, we see the courts effectively commending the reason-
ableness of those involved, as occurred, for example, in Frenchay, where the reason-
ableness of a witness’ opinion was noted: ‘the conclusion at which S’s consultant had
arrived was reasonable and bona ﬁde’.81
The judges’ preference for reasonable co-operation between different parties might
imply that the courts will endorse any consensus that might then result. Certainly, evi-
dence that is unanimously agreed, particularly amongst expert witnesses, can prove
conclusive in court.82 Moreover, the position of the Ofﬁcial Solicitor might acquire
special signiﬁcance, if it accords with one of the parties,83 and perhaps particularly if
the Ofﬁcial Solicitor changes his or her mind having heard all of the evidence.84
However, the unanimity of experts is not always sufﬁcient to determine a case. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court in Aintree endorsed the trial judge’s rejection of the medi-
cal opinion,85 despite this having the backing of the Ofﬁcial Solicitor.86
75 Eg Shefﬁeld Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TH and another [2014] EWCOP 4, per Hayden J at
[5].
76 Eg Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, at 41. For commentary on shared
decision-making as an ethical concept see: L Sandman and C Munthe, ‘Shared Decision Making,
Paternalism and Patient Choice’ (2010) 18 Health Care Anal 60.
77 L (n 39) at [31].
78 Above (n 15) at [5.31].
79 s 4(6).
80 Aintree (n 49), per Lady Hale at [45].
81 Frenchay (n 19) at 411.
82 Eg Re JD (n 70), per Roderic Wood J at [9].
83 Eg KH (n 54); L (n 39).
84 M v N (n 55), per Hayden J at [63]. In our case series, such an occurrence is less rare than Hayden J indi-
cates here eg Re JD (n 70); PP (n 40); Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group v AB and another
[2014] EWCOP 49.
85 An NHS Trust v DJ and others [2012] EWHC 3524.
86 Aintree (n 49), per Lady Hale at [12].
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Sometimes, rather than endorse a position offered by some or even all of the par-
ties, the judges seek to reach their own decision, which on one occasion sought to
capture a compromise. This occurred in VT, a case in which the family wanted to con-
tinue treatment of the patient in all circumstances, but the doctors favoured non-treat-
ment.87 Hayden J offers a compromise by analysing the cardiac and pulmonary
components of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) separately,88 and concluding
that, while cardiac resuscitation is not in the patient’s interests, (brief) respiratory re-
suscitation in certain circumstances is permissible. Given that the body’s cardiac and
pulmonary systems are so closely intertwined, it is questionable whether such a sepa-
ration is logically defensible. However, we have argued that the aim of a compromise
is to make all the parties feel that they have not only sacriﬁced a portion of their aims,
but also gained something too.89 Having made such gains, the parties might then be
more satisﬁed with the solution. Hayden J’s solution looks like such a compromise,90
especially when his rationale is explained: ‘to prohibit CPR only in the event of cardio
collapse, in my view [would] be too blunt; moreover, it seemed to me to be likely to
cause further dispute and perhaps a return to this court’.91
As such, the judges might evince a predilection for reasonableness and for co-
operation, but it is not necessarily going to be the case that any consensus reached by
the parties will be endorsed by the court. No matter how united the parties might ap-
pear, we again gain the sense that the judges retain the ﬁnal right of say. Sometimes
they will authorise the course favoured by the parties; elsewhere, they will adopt a dif-
ferent course, which might capture a compromise between the different parties. While
the judges seem to have a preference for the parties approaching these cases in particu-
lar ways, we do not yet have a clear idea of the judges’ own approaches to these cases.
These approaches become clearer in our next, major, section, in which we focus
squarely on the judge’s key concern, which is with the best interests of the patient.
VII . STRIKING A BALANCE
In order to reach their decisions about these incapacitated patients, the judges must
determine where the patient’s best interests lie. When approaching this task, the
judges have long been inclined to undertake a balancing exercise, which involves
drawing up factors for or against the proposed course, before reaching a conclusion.
As Thorpe LJ put it in a ruling from 2000, ‘the task in each case is to balance all the
relevant factors and to decide what are the best interests of the person unable to make
his own decision’.92 Thorpe LJ may have suggested that this would occur in ‘each
case’, but (speaking extra-judicially) Baker J has recently indicated that this is not a
87 VT (n 49).
88 ibid at [27–28]. Hayden’s strategy of separating the analysis is founded on obiter statements by Lady Hale
in Aintree (n 49).
89 Huxtable (n 2).
90 Although not cited in this case, the solution (and sense of tentative compromise) is very similar to the ap-
proach taken by Theis J in An NHS Trust v AB [2014] EWHC 1031, a case on which we have commented
in G Birchley and R Huxtable, ‘Critical Decisions for Critically Ill Infants: Principles, Processes, Problems’
in C Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in Honour of the Work of Margaret Brazier
(Routledge 2015) 116.
91 VT (n 49), per Hayden J at [28].
92 Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193, per Thorpe LJ at 203.
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uniform requirement as such; rather, ‘the court will often adopt a balance-sheet ap-
proach’.93 Baker J’s qualiﬁcation is amply borne out in our cases, where we see the
judges taking different approaches to the assessment of the patient’s best interests:
while some judges provide an explicit ‘balance sheet’, others do not.
In eleven of the seventeen cases found within our search period, no balance sheet
is provided in the judgment. In eight of these cases, the omission is explicable. In
seven rulings, the court decided that the patient was in a VS; no balancing exercise is
undertaken in such cases.94 In the eighth case, in which an MCS diagnosis was ac-
cepted, the judge felt that further assessment of the patient was needed, so no ruling
was made on the best interests of the patient.95 This leaves three cases—in all of
which MCS was the accepted diagnosis—in which a balancing exercise was not under-
taken, or at least not articulated. In the ﬁrst of these, the judge provides no reason for
not undertaking an explicit balancing exercise.96 More revealing, in terms of the
courts’ approaches, are the remaining two cases. In these rulings, the (same) judge de-
clined to strike a balance, as he expressed discomfort with the very idea of seeking to
balance different factors. In VT, Hayden J felt that, while considerations of ‘the intrin-
sic value of life itself’ and of ‘pain and indignity . . . can be juxtaposed, they cannot, to
my mind, really be balanced. We are not comparing like with like’.97 He made this
sort of point more forcefully in M v N: ‘The exercise is almost a balance of opposites:
the philosophical as against the personal. For this reason, . . . I consider that a formu-
laic “balance sheet” approach to Mrs. N’s best interests is artiﬁcial’.98
This leaves six cases in which balance sheets were explicitly provided.99 In order to
try to perceive the judges’ approaches, it is worth spelling out the factors cited in these
rulings, as well as the decisions reached. Starting chronologically with the 2004 case of
KH, the balance sheet is one-sided and succinct: on the side of continuing CANH are
the suggestions that survival may be beneﬁcial and starvation less digniﬁed than if KH
were to succumb to her condition.100 In that case, continued treatment was
authorised.
Four or more factors on each side are provided in the ﬁve later cases. In W v M in
2011, seven factors were cited in favour of continued treatment: respect for the sanc-
tity of human life; the pain and distress that might accompany starvation and dehydra-
tion; M will continue to experience sentient life; M may continue to take pleasure
from life; M’s pleasure can be enhanced with improved stimulation; M’s pleasure
could be increased by improved surroundings; and M can be expected to live for
93 Mr Justice Baker, ‘A Matter of Life and Death’ Oxford Shrieval Lecture, 11 October 2016 <https://www.ju
diciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/mr-justice-baker-shrieval-lecture-11102016.pdf> accessed 16
December 2016 (emphasis added).
94 Frenchay (n 19); Re D (n 19); Re H (n 19); A v H (n 18); Re JD (n 70); Gloucestershire (n 84); Re S (n 45).
95 Shefﬁeld (n 75).
96 PP (n 40). Since PP’s awareness was found to be between VS and the lower margin of MCS, it is probable
that she was treated as a PVS patient by the judge.
97 VT (n 49) [20].
98 M v N (n 55) at [70].
99 In appeal cases, the balance sheet provided at ﬁrst instance stands, as it is not in the ambit of the higher
court to overturn the balancing exercise of the lower: see KH (n 54), per Brooke LJ at [28].
100 KH (n 54).
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some years.101 Weighed against these were nine factors pointing towards the removal
of CANH: M’s current and anticipated pain and discomfort; the unpleasant effects of
treatment; evidence of M’s distress; the indignity of M’s situation; M’s wishes and
feelings prior to her collapse; the family’s assessment of what M would want; the fam-
ily’s assessment of M’s best interests; the unlikelihood of M’s recovery from MCS;
and the fact that efforts can be taken to make M’s death as comfortable as possible.102
Baker J decided the former factors outweighed the latter, and ruled in favour of con-
tinued CANH.
In contrast to Baker J, in the next three cases the judges preferred a decision not to
treat. In L in 2013, the issue was whether or not CPR should be withheld. In favour of
providing CPR were seven factors: L was comparatively young and medically stable;
the sanctity of human life; L was aware and deriving comfort from his family; L’s
health had improved in the preceding four months; this would be in line with L’s
wishes, feelings, beliefs, and values; this was what L’s family judged to be in his best in-
terests; and L’s dignity would be honoured and his autonomy promoted.103 However,
Moylan J sided with the 11 factors against undertaking CPR: L’s brain would be un-
likely to recover further or signiﬁcantly; CPR would be unlikely to succeed and would
cause L harm; the decline that would precede CPR would be likely to cause further
brain damage and lessen L’s prospects of recovery; this decline would be likely to
cause further physical damage; although L might judge it acceptable, his quality of life
would be likely to deteriorate following cardiac arrest; no doctor would be likely to be
willing to offer CPR; L was experiencing pain; improvements to L’s health were only
modest; L had endured two or three cardiac arrests in 8 months; L’s recovery was un-
likely and ill-health expected given his signiﬁcant co-morbidities; L was vulnerable to
infection; and continued intensive care would be invasive, painful, and distressing.104
CPR was also one of the treatments at issue in Aintree in 2013, where a briefer bal-
ance sheet was drawn up at ﬁrst instance.105 In favour of treatment were: the sanctity
of life, and the possibility that treatment might prolong David James’ life; James’ qual-
ity of life, from which he gains pleasure, and evidence of some improvements in his
condition; the likelihood that James would want treatment up to the point it became
hopeless; the family’s belief that the point of hopelessness had not been reached; and
that it would be wrong for James to die ‘against a background of bitterness and griev-
ance’.106 Against treatment were said to be the following factors: James’ body and
brain had sustained severe damage, he was unlikely to recover independence, and ‘the
current treatment is invasive and every setback places him at a further disadvantage’;
the treatment may not work; the treatment would be burdensome; and it was not in
James’ ‘interests to face a prolonged, excruciating and undigniﬁed death’.107 The trial
judge favoured treatment and was ruled not to have erred in his approach by the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that withholding treatment
101 W v M (n 17) at [248].
102 ibid at [247].
103 L (n 39) at [121].
104 ibid at [122]
105 DJ (n 85). Repeated in Aintree (n 49) at [11].
106 ibid, per Jackson J at [79].
107 ibid.
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had been appropriate on these factors, since James had deteriorated further by the
time of his death.
In Lincolnshire in 2014, the issue was whether CANH should be withheld. Factors
in favour of CANH were: if successful, N would live for many more years, and rela-
tively comfortably so; N would be spared the effects of non-treatment and associated
risks; N would continue to experience life as a sensate being with some awareness;
likely beneﬁcial treatments could be reinstated; and N might continue to gain some
pleasure from life.108 Paufﬂey J, however, ruled that CANH should be withheld, be-
cause these factors were outweighed by: the likely future pain and distress to N; the
invasiveness of the procedures, which would occur under restraint; the risks associated
with inserting the feeding tube and of re-feeding syndrome; the need for repeated re-
straint or continuing sedation; the indignities of N’s situation; the apparent alignment
with N’s wishes and feelings; and because withdrawal of CANH aligned with what N’s
family believe she would have wanted.109
Finally, there is St George’s v P from 2015, in which Newton J ruled in favour of
continued haemodialysis. He was most persuaded by the following factors: P’s life
would be preserved, which is what he would have wanted; withdrawal of treatment
would cause P’s death within days; P showed clear responses to his family and friends;
and treatment ‘permits improvement of increased awareness to develop, if it can’.110
These outweighed the considerations that: some patients die during this treatment;
P’s life expectancy was already reduced; treatment is undigniﬁed and may be painful
or uncomfortable; P lacked independence; and P likely had no potential for ‘meaning-
ful’ functional recovery.111
Two striking points emerge from these ﬁndings. First, even in cases in which the
patient is conﬁrmed as being in a MCS, the judges do not consistently undertake a
balancing exercise. Here, we can query whether some consistency in approach—ie
drawing up a balance sheet or not doing so—is desirable. However, secondly, it is
also apparent that consistency in approach will not necessarily mean consistency in
outcomes. In those six MCS cases where balance sheets were provided, the judges did
tend to point to similar factors, both in favour of and against a proposed course. On
the side of treatment, we see recurring references to the importance of preserving life,
the patient’s (positive) quality of life, the patient’s dignity, and the wishes of the pa-
tient and/or their family. Some of these factors also feature in the case for non-
treatment: for example, there are repeated references to the wishes of the patient
and/or their family, the patient’s dignity, and the poor quality of life the patient is en-
during or can be expected to endure.
There is, then, some commonality in approach in terms of factors to which the
courts are alert, but this does not necessarily mean that outcomes can be predicted:
sometimes the judge will opt for treatment, other times for non-treatment. That the
balancing exercise is not a quantitative exercise is borne out by W v M, in which there
were nine factors in favour of removing CANH but seven factors in favour of
108 Lincolnshire (n 47) at [59].
109 ibid at [58].
110 St George’s v P (n 41) at [43]; see also [35]–[38].
111 ibid.
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continued treatment, and the latter was the course preferred by Baker J. Evidently, the
balancing exercise is qualitative in nature. Speaking extra-judicially, Baker J has ob-
served that ‘It is the weight to be attached to each factor that is important rather than
the number of factors on each side of the argument’.112 This might explain the differ-
ent decisions: one particular factor might assume particular importance in a given
case, as indeed the sanctity of life did in Baker J’s own decision in W v M. But we ap-
pear no closer to knowing which sort of factor will operate as a trump card in which
sort of case. Maybe it would be wrong to expect to know this: as we have seen, the
judges are wont to emphasise that every case is different. And, as we have also seen,
judges are there to judge. However, the cases evidently have some shared features.
More such features emerge in our ﬁnal section, in which the decisions that the judges
might reach start to become more apparent.
VIII . SEEKING CERTAINTY
Finally, our ﬁndings suggest that judges favour certainty, speciﬁcally in terms of diag-
nosis and prognosis, with particular ﬁndings here arguably inﬂuencing how the court
will rule.
We can ﬁrst detect the judges’ search for certainty in their references to the diag-
nostic guidance issued by the medical profession. Deﬁciencies in the extant guidance
are noted in the early rulings, in which the patient’s diagnosis is not entirely settled. In
H, for example, the judge suspects ‘that it may be that it is time to review’ the guid-
ance on determining VS.113 However, the phenomenon does recur later, after MCS
had become a more established diagnosis: in W v M, for example, Baker J notes how
both experts regarded the relevant ‘guidance as now out of date’.114 Such comments
serve to convey a situation that is changing and thus a story—of medical science, the
law and the patient—that is evolving. It is conceivable that the judges’ comments
have helped to build the case for revisiting the guidance: review and revision occurred
afterW v M, for example. However, it is also plausible that the judges’ comments—in-
formed by the evidence presented to the court—merely express (the aforemen-
tioned115) reservations that are held by the relevant experts at the relevant time.116
MCS may have evolved into its own diagnostic category, but it is a notably broad one,
perhaps encompassing degrees and therefore a great variety of patients, as indeed the
court has noted.117 Against such a backdrop, it may not be surprising that the judicial
approaches have yet to settle into a coherent whole. Indeed, the relative paucity of
published decisions further suggests that the courts have not yet had time to build up
a uniform approach.118 In short, there may be too few cases and too little scientiﬁc
112 Above (n 93). He cites Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882.
113 A v H (n 18), per Dame Butler-Sloss P at 717.
114 W v M (n 17), per Baker J at [55].
115 See Section II.
116 These changing approaches are mirrored by changing perceptions of families whose relationships with their
relative and the carers is also dynamic. Thus, families lose faith in carers and hospitals (eg St George’s v P
(n 41) at [7]) or question their own motivations for wishing to keep their relative alive (eg W v M (n 18),
at [15]).
117 Eg Aintree (n 49), per Lady Hale at [6]; An NHS Trust v L (n 39), per Moylan J at [103] and passim.
118 In contrast with the position on VS patients. In Bland, Lord Keith noted that court approval was needed ‘at
least for the time being and until a body of experience and practice has been built up’ (above n 14, at 859).
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certainty for the judges to have settled on the approaches that should be taken and
the decisions that should be reached.
But there are indications that the approaches are settling. These indications are pro-
vided in the judges’ references to two areas of perceived scientiﬁc certainty. First, the
judges appear to seek certainty in diagnosis—and once the diagnosis is settled, the ap-
proach to be taken by the court also becomes more settled. As Newton J states in P:
If P is in VS, and there is no real prospect of recovery, then it would not be in
his best interests to continue treat him (because a person in a continuing vegeta-
tive state has no interests and therefore no best interests). However, if he is in a
minimally conscious state then the issue to be considered must be on the bal-
ance of best interests in accordance with section 4 MCA and the appropriate
professional guidance.119
This comment was made in 2015, when the diagnostic guidance had recently been re-
vised,120 and the courts had begun to build up an approach to cases of MCS, having
already established their approach to patients in the VS. A particular, and certain, diag-
nosis appears to light the way for the court. By extension, the courts will be alert to
any uncertainty in diagnosis and will seek to have this resolved, in order that a deci-
sion can be reached.121 As one sees in the cases in which MCS was queried but VS
was ultimately conﬁrmed, even lone voices of doubt will be heard, and the evidence
interrogated, in order to determine which diagnosis (and thus legal approach) is to be
preferred.122
In short, the legal approach is ﬁrst determined by resolving whether the patient is
in a VS or MCS. Almost without exception,123 the outcome for patients in the former
group is predictable: life-supporting treatment will be withdrawn or withheld.
However, as we saw in the previous section, this is not (yet?) the case for the patients
in the MCS: we can increasingly anticipate the sorts of factors that the judges will
take into account, but not necessarily the decision that will then be taken.
We nevertheless come closer to being able to make such predictions once we ap-
preciate that certainty in prognosis also appears to exert some inﬂuence on the outcome
of the judgments. A twin concern with certainty in diagnosis and prognosis is evident
in Cobb J’s decision in PP, in which an expert witness is reported to have described
the patient as:
‘somewhere on the spectrum between the vegetative state and an extremely low
position on the minimally conscious/minimally responsive state’ with no real
prospect of a change in that condition. He felt that P had entered a ‘terminal’
phase of her life, which he described as ‘pre-terminal hibernation’.124
119 St George’s v P (n 41), per Newton J at [13].
120 Royal College of Physicians (n 6).
121 Eg Re S (n 45), per Hayden J at [8–9]. Other examples of uncertainty include: Gloucestershire (n 84);
Aintree (n 49), per Lady Hale at [41].
122 Eg Re JD (n 70); Re S (n 45).
123 See An NHS Trust v J [2006] All ER (D) 73 (Dec).
124 PP (n 40), per Cobb J at [33].
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In contrast to W v M, where treatment was to continue, the judge decided that
CANH was to be withdrawn from PP. In cases like PP, which culminate in non-
treatment, reference may be made to the treatment being ‘detrimental’ if the patient is
declining,125 or to it being ‘unnatural’, even ‘cruel’.126 However there are two particu-
lar distinguishing features of such cases that might appear, in terms of prognosis, to
explain the different outcomes.127 First, there is the patient’s possibility of recovery.
Note that, in W v M, a witness judged it ‘“highly improbable” that M would emerge
from MCS. She placed this probability at less than ﬁve per cent’.128 M’s chance of re-
covery might be slight but it is not absent. Contrast this with the early case of
Frenchay, in which there was some diagnostic uncertainty but the experts felt, after
two years of attempting to stimulate the patient, ‘that there was no chance of recov-
ery’.129 In M v N, a similar consensus existed,130 while in P the door appears to be left
open to the possibility of slight recovery.131
Secondly, the patient’s proximity to death appears relevant. The patient in W v M
appeared to have a life expectancy of 10 years.132 Contrast this with PP, who was con-
sidered to be nearing death (‘pre-terminal’). Other cases in which the imminence of
the patient’s death might have nudged the judge towards authorising the removal of
life-support include TH: although the case did not result in a declaration, it was noted
that the patient ‘could die within the next few days/weeks as a result of complications
of his neurological condition’ or, in ‘the best case scenario’, would not develop such
complications but nevertheless would only endure ‘for several more months or even a
year or so’.133
As such, the courts seem to invest in scientiﬁc certainty. Certainty in diagnosis will
light the court’s way, with VS cases dealt with in one way (and leading to predictable
outcomes), MCS cases another. Yet, even with MCS cases, which seem generally less
predictable, there are prognostic indications that appear to nudge the court towards
one decision, rather than another. If the patient has no chance of recovery or the pa-
tient is close to death, it seems more likely a decision will be made not to treat.134
Doubtless, further rulings are needed to ﬂesh out the factors that will incline the court
to non-treatment as opposed to treatment, but there are already some indications
available to future litigants, on which basis they can begin to predict how their case
will be resolved.
125 PP (n 40), per Cobb J at [11].
126 L (n 39), per Moylan J at [25].
127 We say ‘might’, as it is not absolutely clear that prognosis is determinative. Such prognoses are open to dis-
pute (as is the case in Shefﬁeld (n 75)), a problem that might undermine their ability to inﬂuence the
judgment.
128 W v M (n 17), per Baker J at [203].
129 Frenchay (n 19), per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at 406 (emphasis added).
130 M v N (n 55) at [74].
131 St George’s v P (n 41), at [37].
132 W v M (n 17), per Baker J at [26].
133 Shefﬁeld (n 75), per Hayden J at [24].
134 Such reasoning reﬂects the approach taken in the seminal American decision in Quinlan, in which the court
indicated that the governmental interest in the preservation of life weakens ‘as the prognosis dims’: Quinlan,
(n 13), per Hughes CJ at 41.
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IX . DISCUSSION
MCS, and the modest pool of rulings determining the fates of such patients, has al-
ready sparked a great deal of academic interest, with different scholars exploring the
views of those involved in such proceedings,135 plus their ethical and legal dimen-
sions.136 Rather than replicate such work here, we seek to offer three reﬂections on
our overlapping ﬁndings.
First, these judgments are evidently inﬂuenced by the ‘scientiﬁc’—for which, read
‘medical’—evidence before the court. Some of the ﬁndings suggest that the courts are
keen to assert their authority over these cases of life of death. This trend is familiar
from other medico-legal contexts, where life or death is not necessarily at stake. The
ruling in Bolam, which found that doctors can look to responsible medical opinion to
defend a negligence action, long dominated medical law, both within and beyond its
original parameters.137 However, the courts have increasingly sought to re-assert their
authority in relation to negligence: judges determine whether the body of opinion in
question is to be considered ‘responsible’.138 This assertion of judicial power certainly
emerges from our themes. But what is also striking in our cases, albeit with some ex-
ceptions, is that the Bolam attitude also appears to be alive and well: in seeking to
reach a decision, the judges will look particularly closely at the medical evidence and
the opinions of the doctors. Perhaps the judges’ recourse to these experts is explicable
because the MCS diagnosis is relatively recent and not entirely settled, and the judges
have also only recently begun to encounter such patients: better, perhaps, to heed the
medical experts when navigating such terrain.139 Whether families (or, perhaps, other
carers) will welcome this apparent inclination is, of course, open to question.140
Secondly, the rulings seem to offer support to a legal realist, as opposed to a legal
formalist, understanding of judicial decision-making. Formalists contend that legal an-
swers to legal problems can be found within the law: extra-legal sources, such as ethi-
cal norms, are not needed. Realists, on the other hand, dispute the determinacy of
law, ‘insisting that judges primarily decide appellate cases by responding to the stimu-
lus of the facts of the case’.141 Few of our cases reached the appellate courts, but the
central point appears to stand. Although the extent to which the judges are drawing
135 Eg C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Withdrawing Artiﬁcial Nutrition and Hydration from Minimally Conscious
and Vegetative Patients: Family Perspectives’ (2015) 41(2) J Med Eth 157.
136 Eg A Mullock, ‘Deciding the Fate of a Minimally Conscious Patient: An Unsatisfactory Balancing Act?:W v
M And Others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam)’ (2012) 20(3) Med LR 460; D Wilkinson and J Savulescu, ‘Is it
Better to be Minimally Conscious than Vegetative?’ (2013) 39(9) J Med Eth 557; R Huxtable, ‘“In a
Twilight World”: Judging the Value of Life for the Minimally Conscious Patient” (2013) 39(9) J Med Eth
565; R Heywood, ‘Moving on from Bland: The Evolution of the Law and Minimally Conscious Patients’
(2014) 22(4) Med LR 548; R Huxtable, ‘From Twilight to Breaking Dawn? Best Interests, Autonomy, and
Minimally Conscious Patients: M v N [2015] EWCOP 76 (Fam)’ (2016) Med LR doi: 10.1093/medlaw/
fww008.
137 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. See eg M Brazier and J Miola, ‘Bye-
Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Med LR 85.
138 Bolitho (Deceased) v City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232;Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] UKSC 11.
139 The ﬁrst author is grateful to Clark Hobson for his insightful observations on this point.
140 C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Withdrawing Artiﬁcial Nutrition and Hydration from Minimally Conscious
and Vegetative Patients: Family Perspectives’ (2015) 41(2) J Med Ethics 157.
141 N Aletras, and others, ‘Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural
Language Processing perspective’ (2016) 2 Peer J Comput Sci e93.
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on ethical norms in these cases warrants further analysis,142 the ‘rules’ (such as the
one holding that the test is the ‘best interests’ of the patient) appear not to be entirely
determinate and the judges seem keen to ﬁx certain (particularly ‘scientiﬁc’) facts in
order to reach their decisions.
Thirdly, and connected to the problem of indeterminacy, it is apparent that the rul-
ings are not entirely consistent or predictable. Certainly, the approaches we detected
revealed a degree of consistency and predictability, but arguably not of the measure
that might be anticipated by legal formalists, and what (little?) consistency there is in
approach does not guarantee consistency in outcomes. Rather, the message seems to
be that a judge will do precisely that—judge—when called on to determine a patient’s
best interests.143
Whether this is sufﬁcient is open to question. As Birks has noted:
The law . . . is under constant surveillance. Vigilant critics quite rightly pick over
the substance of every judgment. And it is an unrelenting question whether,
through time, but allowing for the changes of perception which come with the
passage of time, the courts are or are not, can or cannot be, true to the aspiration
impartially to treat like cases alike.144
For some, like Fuller, this aspiration is central to the rule of law: for him, law is ‘the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’,145 and for law to
succeed in this endeavour, it must be consistent in what it says and does.
The greater such consistency there is in the law’s operations, then the more pre-
dictable the outcomes of these operations will be.146 Interest in the predictability of
the courts’ decisions has prompted some researchers to devise
models that can be used to unveil patterns driving judicial decisions. This can be
useful, for both lawyers and judges, as an assisting tool to rapidly identify cases
and extract patterns which lead to certain decisions.147
These particular researchers utilised information technology to help predict decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights—reported as ‘robot judges’ in some of the
ensuing media coverage.148
While our method of investigating rulings on the (non-)treatment of patients in
the MCS has not yielded the predictability of ‘robot judges’, we had hoped that our
analysis might similarly enable future litigants to identify the features of cases that
142 Which we seek to undertake in a future article.
143 J Harrington, ‘Deciding Best Interests: Medical Progress, Clinical Judgment and the ‘Good Family’ (2003)
3 Web JCLI.
144 P Birks, ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’ (2000) 20(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2–3.
145 L Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edn, Yale University Press 1969) 96.
146 E.g. J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 The Law Quarterly Review 195; J Waldron, ‘The
Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory’ (1989) 2(1) Ratio Juris 79, 84.
147 Aletras (n 141).
148 A Grifﬁn, ‘Robot Judges could Soon be Helping with Court Cases’ The Independent (London, 24 October
2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/ai-judge-robot-european-court-
of-human-rights-law-verdicts-artiﬁcial-intelligence-a7377351.html> accessed 16 December 2016.
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point to one outcome as opposed to another (for example, treatment as opposed to
non-treatment). Happily, some such indications emerged; less happily, as a more re-
cent ruling indicates, decisions might be even less predictable than the analysis of our
cases has suggested. The ruling in Briggs was issued after our period of data collection
and analysis had concluded, so was not included in our sample.149 Our cases implied,
inter alia, that the judges prefer that a patient with a long life expectancy (continue
to) be treated and that medical opinion will outweigh family opinion. If these are
trends, then they are called into question by Briggs, in which the patient’s life expec-
tancy appeared to be in the region of 9–10 years, and the family’s views—particularly
on what the patient would (not) want—proved inﬂuential to the court’s decision that
treatment cease. Evidently, we should continue to monitor any themes and trends as
the pool of cases grows, to ascertain whether the court’s approaches will further settle
and, indeed, whether there is an evolution in judicial approach, towards a more patient
or family-oriented perspective.
X. CONCLUSION
The necessary caveats notwithstanding, key features did emerge from the MCS cases
we analysed, which begin to reveal the courts’ approaches to these cases. First, the
judges appear keen to frame the cases in such a way that these are rightly matters for
judicial determination: a tragic, contested, urgent, complex, and unique case is one ﬁt
for a judge. Secondly, the judges will appraise the types and forms of expertise that en-
ter the courtroom, and they seem to prefer the ‘objective’ and ‘scientiﬁc’, and in partic-
ular the views of the doctors involved. Thirdly, the judges appear alert to the
reasonableness of the evidence (and, indeed, the parties) and will look favourably on
parties who are willing to co-operate. This does not mean, however, that the judges
will straightforwardly endorse any consensus reached by the parties; rather, the judges
will reach their own decisions. Those decisions must be taken on the basis of the best
interests of the patient. Our fourth set of ﬁndings reveals different approaches to this
assessment: some judges will draw up a balance sheet, while others will not—and
even when that approach is taken, different decisions might result, despite the recur-
ring presence of similar factors on the balance sheet. However, consistency of ap-
proach and predictability of outcome become more evident in our ﬁfth set of ﬁndings,
in which we see the courts seeking (scientiﬁc) certainty. Certainty in diagnosis—ei-
ther VS or MCS—will determine the court’s general approach, albeit without entirely
indicating the likely outcome, at least for MCS patients. However, the outcome for
the latter patients does potentially become more predictable when certain prognostic
information is revealed: if the patient’s chances of recovery are low or the patient is
close to death, a decision not to treat appears more likely to be issued.
Briggs, of course, reminds us that it is early days, and decisions about patients in
the MCS still remain scarce. Time will tell whether the themes identiﬁed here will per-
sist as more cases come before the courts. For now, it seems there are some cues for
future litigants to pick up, such as the courts’ apparent preference for co-operation
and their likely reliance on the medical evidence, particularly around diagnosis and
prognosis. Whether these are the right cues, which will lead to the ‘right’ decisions
149 Briggs (n 31).
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remains to be seen. Insofar as there is still evidence of inconsistency and unpredict-
ability—for example, around the deployment of a balancing exercise—this should be
a matter for concern. But examining inconsistency will only take us to the realisation
that two or more answers are possible in practice. Which should be the approach
taken, or the answer provided, in principle will merit further investigation.
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